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COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS INVOLVING
FOREIGN AIRLINES: A REVIEW OF THE POLICY OF THE
UNITED STATES CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD*
By BURTON A. LANDYt
I. INTRODUCTION
T RADITIONALLY, the airline industry has been highly individualistic.
Today's air carriers, almost without exception, are the product of
these individualistic pioneering efforts. Yet, during the current decade,
there has been a notable trend "to band together" rather than the tradi-
tional "go it alone" approach. A manifestation of this trend to join up
was the merger movement of the early 1960's. This characteristic was
due in large part to the poor financial condition of many of the airlines.
As the jet transition took place and the financial health of the airlines
improved, the merger wave subsided for a time, and the airlines seemed
to return to their usual, independent way of doing business. However,
even then cooperative agreements were sought, and today the use of such
agreements among foreign airlines is particularly evident. Again, the rea-
sons are basically economic, as many airlines have concluded that their
resources in equipment and manpower are not sufficient to meet the com-
petition of those airlines which can afford to remain independent.
The nature of these cooperative agreements and how the United States
Civil Aeronautics Board (hereinafter CAB) looks upon these arrange-
ments are basic, fundamental questions which foreign airlines must con-
sider inasmuch as the policies of the CAB in this area ultimately affect
their operations to and from the United States. Therefore, the purpose of
this analysis is to review some of the cooperative agreements entered into
by foreign airlines in the past and to evaluate the attitude of the CAB
towards these arrangements.
II. TYPES OF COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS
Cooperative agreements between air carriers exist in a wide range and
variety of forms; however, this article will only focus upon those coopera-
tive agreements involving dry leases, wet leases, blocked space agreements,
interchanges and pooling. It is appropriate, therefore, to review the defi-
nitions of these terms:
* This article is an expansion of a presentation made at the VI Inter-american Aviation Law
Conference held in Miami, Florida, on March 21, 1969.
t B.S.L., Northwestern University; J.D., University of Miami School of Law; Chairman, Aero-
nautical Law Committee of the Florida Bar Ass'n; Chairman, Aviation Law Committee, Inter-
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Dry Leases: A dry lease in its usual form involves the lease of a bare air-
craft by one party to another. In this lease, only the aircraft is made
available by the lessor, and the lessee supplies the crew, fuel and exercises
full operational control. Inherent in this arrangement is the total surrender
of the aircraft by the lessor and its control by the lessee.
Wet Leases: A wet lease normally involves the lease of an aircraft with
the fuel and crew to carry out the specific operation. A significant factor
in this arrangement is whether the lessor or the lessee exercises operational
control of the aircraft.
Blocked Space Agreements: Blocked space agreements are leases of a de-
termined portion of an aircraft, such as the seats and/or cargo space.
An agreed sum is paid by the lessee to the lessor regardless of the utilization
made by the lessee of the leased space.
Pooling: Pooling, in general, can involve any cooperative agreement;
however, in the United States, the term primarily designates agreements
providing for splitting of revenues and/or costs.
Interchanges: An interchange involves the use of an aircraft owned by
one airline over the routes of another airline in conjunction with flights
over routes of the owner airline, which either preceded or succeeded the
interchange flight. In each sector of the flight the aircraft is controlled
and manned by a crew of the airline having authority to operate over
such sector. In effect, one airline has merely "dry leased" the aircraft from
the other. More than two airlines may enter into the interchange agreement
so that there may be a succession of dry leases in which one aircraft be-
longing to one of the airlines involved is used over the routes of the other
airlines.
Having defined the basic terms, it is appropriate to focus next on the
United States air transport policy.
III. POLICY STATEMENTS AND LAW
A. Policy Statements
The most comprehensive expression of the United States' policy is con-
tained in the statement on International Air Transport Policy of April
1963.1 This statement was prepared by a steering committee appointed by
President Kennedy which consisted of representatives of the Federal Avia-
tion Agency, Civil Aeronautics Board, State Department and other re-
lated governmental agencies and departments.
In approving the statement of policy, President Kennedy said:
The United States air transport policy takes into account all of the U.S. in-
terests: The health and growth of our carriers, the contributions which air
transport can make to our national security, and above all, the needs of the
consumer-the traveller and shipper. It does so in a way which considers the
legitimate needs of other nations, and the basic principles under which we
' Press Release to A. M. S., Office of the White House Press Secretary (April 23, 1968).
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conduct our international relations. I am directing the officials of this govern-
ment concerned with air transport to be guided by this policy statement in
carrying out their statutory responsibilities.'
The underlying policy throughout the statement favors "expansion,
not restriction," whether by government or through intercarrier arrange-
ments. The United States has determined that any policy or arbitrary
restriction of capacity, division of markets by carrier agreements, en-
couraging high rates or curtailing services for which a demand exists
would be harmful to the United States national interest and contrary to
its basic policy of competitive enterprise.
The area of air carrier pooling is specifically treated in the policy state-
ment as follows:
4. Air Carrier Pooling. It is a common practice for foreign carriers to form
combinations or pools which divide revenues or traffic on a particular route
or market. Our dealings with foreign carrier pools must be on a case-by-case
basis. We must not encourage pools which substantially reduce competition
to the detriment of the system we seek. In considering the possible effect of
such foreign pools, their size or market power and their intentions or attitudes
toward a basically competitive system are clearly relevant factors.
There are times when it is suggested that U.S. carriers participate in such
pools. We believe such arrangements will generally impair the benefits com-
petition can bring to the system, and it will be difficult to limit the arrange-
ments once this practice has begun. Therefore, U.S. carriers will be permitted
to participate in them only when the national interest requires.'
Section 9 of the same policy statement recognizes that more intensive
consideration in the Foreign Aid Program should be given to the con-
tributions that international and regional aviation programs can make to
the economic development in developing countries.4
While the foregoing is governmental policy as set forth by the Presi-
dent of the United States, the Congress of the United States has legislated
on the subject. Specifically, the following sections of the Federal Aviation
Act are pertinent.
B. Federal Aviation Act
The CAB is charged with the responsibility for administering the eco-
nomic aspects of the Federal Aviation Act.
1. Section 402.
Section 402 requires that a foreign air carrier show it is "fit, willing
and able properly to perform" air transportation. It sets out the procedure
for application for a permit and grants the Board the power to prescribe
terms and conditions for the regulation of the permit.'
2. Section 408.
Section 408, in the absence of Board approval, prohibits certain mo-
nopolistic, and restraint of trade practices, such as:
2 Id.
3 Id.4 Id.
5 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 402, 72 Stat. 757 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1372 (1964).
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(a) Consolidation and merger of two air carriers;
(b) purchases, leases or agreements by one carrier to operate the
properties of another air carrier; or
(c) acquisition by one air carrier of the control of another air carrier,
and related activities.'
3. Section 411.
Section 411 provides for Board investigation of alleged unfair or de-
ceptive practices or unfair methods of competition in air transportation
and sales activities. If the Board finds any unfair practices, it is empowered
to hold hearings and to issue cease and desist orders."
4. Section 412.
Section 412 requires every air carrier to file copies and memorandums
of all agreements for pooling or apportioning earnings, losses, traffic, serv-
ices or equipment, or relating to rates, classification, safety, economy and
efficiency of operation, or for controlling, regulating or eliminating com-
petition, regulating stops, or for other "cooperative working arrange-
ments." The Board will then approve or disapprove such agreements, de-
pending upon their effect on the public interest and any violations of
the Act.8
5. Section 416(b).
Section 416 (b) provides that the Board may exempt air carriers from
other provisions of the Title if it feels that the application of the rule
would be an undue burden on the airlines and would not be in the public
interest. This section specifically deals with "air carriers" and does not
provide an exemption for "foreign air carriers."'
C. CAB General Policy On Wet Leases
The Civil Aeronautics Board Procedural Regulations outline the CAB's
position on wet leases to foreign air carriers, as follows:
1. Section 399.19
(a) The Board defines wet leases as those in which the lessor provides
both the aircraft and the crew for a performance period of over 60 days.
(b) The wet lease will be authorized by the Board if it is deemed to
be in the public interest by meeting the following criteria:
(1) The operations under the lease will not have a significant adverse
competitive impact on any United States carried. The Board will consider
such factors as relative size, financial strength and route competition of the
carriers involved.
(2) The United States carrier must either have an urgent need for
additional utilization of its equipment, or need more revenue. The Board
considers financial conditions, and its goal is the promotion of a healthy
competitive system.
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 408, 72 Stat. 767 (1958), as amended, 74 Star. 901, 49
U.S.C. § 1378 (1964).
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 5 411, 72 Star. 769 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1964).8 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 5 412, 72 Stat. 770 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1382 (1964).
9 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 5416(b), 72 Star. 771 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1386 (1964).
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(3) The wet lease must not involve revenue or profit sharing by the
United States air carrier-lessor.
(4) The lease must not impair the United States carrier's ability to
fulfill its certificate obligations.
(5) The United States air carrier must not place undue reliance on
wet leasing as a source of revenue.
(c) Approval by the Board of a wet lease will be subject to the follow-
ing conditions:
(1) If the foreign air carrier is in established international air service
with its own equipment, wet leasing arrangements with a United States car-
rier may be approved for an initial one-year period. Additional periods may
be granted up to a maximum of two years from the beginning of the wet
lease arrangement.
(2) If the foreign air carrier is in an early stage of development, the
leasing arrangement may be approved for a maximum period of two years.
However, the foreign carrier must demonstrate that it will be in a position
to establish an independent operation at the end of the two-year period.
(3) If the wet lease is entered into solely to enable the foreign air
carrier to replace equipment on an emergency basis, the lease may be ap-
proved for up to a six-month period."
IV. SIGNIFICANT CASES
During the past ten years, there have been a number of cases before
the CAB involving cooperative agreements of foreign air carriers. Some
of these cases concern arrangements between a United States air carrier
and a foreign air carrier. Other arrangements have been between foreign
air carriers.
A. Cooperative Agreements Between United States Carriers
And Foreign Air Carriers
1. VIASA-Pan American Airways."
In 1961, VIASA and Pan American entered into an agreement con-
cerning traffic arrangements as to scheduling and exploitation of the mar-
ket on the New York/Caracas sector. The agreement, which was sub-
ject to governmental approval, had been negotiated to improve the posi-
tion of both airlines in this sector. It was filed with the CAB but re-
jected shortly thereafter.
The Board held that the agreement was inconsistent with United States
International Civil Aviation policy and with the Bilateral Air Transport
Agreement between the United States and Venezuela in that it placed
arbitrary restrictions on the rights for the carriage of traffic granted to
the United States in the agreement. Additionally, it was feared that ap-
'
0 CAB Procedural Regulations, Sec. 399.19 as added by Amendment No. 6, 30 Fed. Reg. 5625
(1965).
" In the matter of an agreement between Pan American World Airways, Inc., and Venezolana
Internacional de Aviacion, S. A., relating to certain traffic arrangements. Order disapproving agree-
ment: CAB Doc. No. 15385 (OSN E-17354) Aug. 23, 1961, 34 C.A.B. 800 (1961).
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proval of this agreement would establish an undesirable precedent which
might open the door to demands for similar cooperative agreements with
United States flag carriers throughout the world. The Board also held that
approval of the agreement which apportioned the proposed service by the
two carriers between New York and Caracas restrained competition in
the market, contrary to provisions of the Federal Aviation Act.
2. Seaboard-Lufthansa.2
In October 1961, Seaboard filed with the CAB copies of an agree-
ment with Lufthansa relative to the purchase by Lufthansa of cargo
space on aircraft operated by Seaboard on the New York/Frankfort
sector. The terms of this agreement provided that Lufthansa would pur-
chase on each flight 20,000 pounds of capacity, and that full payment
was to be made whether or not the entire 20,000 pound capacity was
utilized. Seaboard urged that this arrangement would provide it with
substantial fixed revenue which would aid materially in the financing of
a modern fleet of cargo aircraft which, incidentally, could be made avail-
able to the military in times of emergency.
In this case, the Board recognized that the acquisition of a new type
of aircraft resulted in sharply increased capacity and influenced Seaboard
to seek means of using this capacity, particularly in view of Seaboard's
then financial situation. Under these circumstances and for a limited
period, such an arrangement warranted favorable consideration by the
Board. The CAB, however, took the position that its action on the agree-
ment should not enable Lufthansa to control, to hold out, to advertise and
to identify as its own the services being performed by Seaboard, and
appropriate conditions designed to preclude these effects were attached
to the approval.
3. Air Afrique-Pan American Airways."
In January 1964, Pan American filed with the CAB copies of an
agreement with Air Afrique, a multi-national company established pur-
suant to the Treaty of Yaounde and owned by a number of African re-
publics. Said agreement provided for the leasing by Pan American of
seats and proportionate cargo space to Air Afrique on flights of Pan
American. In 1964, Air Afrique already had a substantial air transport
system in operation and owned and operated both piston and jet aircraft
which were used in regional and intercontinental routes respectively.
Here, the Board concluded that the agreement represented a cooper-
tive working arrangement between a United States air carrier and a
foreign air carrier within the meaning of section 412 of the Act. The
Board commented that the agreement probably would not warrant ap-
proval if aviation policy grounds alone were to be controlling. However,
the United States Department of State advised the Board that it supported
12 Agreement Between Seaboard World Airlines, Inc., and Deutsch Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft
filed pursuant to Sec. 412 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, relating to blocked
space arrangements. Agreement CAB Doc. No. 15873, as amended; agreement CAB Doc. No. 17708
(OSN E-21042) July 9, 1964.
" Air Afrique, CAB Doc. No. 15007 (OSN E-24597) May 21, 1964, 40 C.A.B. 759 (1964).
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approval of the agreement on broader "national interest grounds." The
reasons advanced by the State Department were:
(a) That such arrangements were considered a valid transitional instrument
for the development of air transport relations with developing countries;
(b) that the provision of service was warranted on economic grounds; that
the market was then inadequate to support normal service by both
United States and foreign flag carriers; that it was anticipated that a
normal exchange of traffic routes would be economically feasible at some
future date; that the foreign flag carrier was organized on a rational
economic basis; and that the proposed arrangement was likely to con-
tribute towards its economic viability; and
(c) that the arrangement supported the United States objective of encourag-
ing regional carriers for long-haul operations of several nations.
The Board concluded that the criteria set forth by the State Depart-
ment applied to the agreement under consideration, and that these criteria
would preclude any substantial threat to the maintenance and develop-
ment of a competitive international air transport system. Therefore, it
granted its approval.
4. Airlift-Alitalia."
In February 1964, Airlift and Alitalia entered into an agreement for
the use, on the Milan/New York City sector, of a DC-8 cargo aircraft
owned by Airlift. Airlift applied to the CAB for an exemption from
the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act to the extent necessary to ope-
rate the flights. Alitalia's position was that it did not have the crews
necessary to operate the DC-8, but that if it decided to purchase its air-
craft in the future, it would then qualify its own pilots and limit the
lease to the aircraft alone. A price per round trip was agreed upon, and
there was a provision for a sharing of the profit if more than a specified
amount of freight was carried.
In this case, the Board approved in part, and denied in part, the agree-
ment. It permitted the services to be operated for a six-month period,
provided that the profit-sharing financial provision was eliminated. The
Board indicated that it would look with favor on a subsequent agreement
under which Airlift would lease the aircraft, and Alitalia would provide
the crew.
The CAB therefore reaffirmed its policy against long-period chartering
of aircraft by a United States carrier to a foreign carrier. It, nevertheless,
made an exception to that policy inasmuch as a dispute between the United
States and Italy concerning the bilateral agreement was then pending and
in arbitration. The Board took into consideration this "unusual circum-
stance" to justify departure from its traditional policy. In addition, the
case also clearly confirmed the policy of the United States against revenue
sharing.
14Application of Airlift International, Inc., for an exemption pursuant to § 416(b) of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended. CAB Doc. No. 1S081 (OSN E-20635) March 31,
1964, 40 C.A.B. 948 (1964).
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B. Cooperative Agreements Between Foreign Air Carriers
1. TAP-Alitalia."
Transportes Aereos Portugueses (hereinafter TAP) presented to the
CAB a request for a foreign air carrier permit, along with a proposed
agreement with Alitalia under which TAP would initially offer services
by utilizing space leased on the Lisbon/New York portion of each flight
operated by Alitalia between Rome and New York. The agreement pro-
vided that TAP would lease one half of the space of Alitalia's aircraft
operating between Lisbon and New York at an agreed rental. Either
party could terminate the agreement, although the record showed that
the intent was that the agreement would last for five years. At the end of
this period, Alitalia-leased flights would be gradually phased out. As the
traffic increased, TAP's intention was to use its own aircraft.
Initially, since the equipment was owned and operated by Alitalia, the
flights would be operated by Italian crews. At such times as TAP inaugu-
rated services with its own aircraft, it would supply crews to operate the
equipment. As to cabin personnel, stewards and stewardesses would be
employed by TAP to handle its passengers from the outset. Ground-
handling of passengers would be performed by TAP at Lisbon and, in
New York, Alitalia would provide facilities and personnel.
The record in the case developed that there was no intention either to
promote jointly the TAP-Alitalia operation or to hold out, in any way,
the services to the public as being operated as part of a unified system.
Alitalia was obligated to affix identification marks of TAP to all aircraft
used on the route and to permit TAP to place promotional material aboard
the aircraft.
The Board issued foreign air carrier permits to TAP and to Alitalia
to engage in the proposed operation with the usual conditions, such as:
(a) Prohibiting the passing off of services of one as services of the
other;
(b) limiting general agency agreements;
(c) maintaining separate identities through appropriate markings,
etc.
This case is significant because it involves an agreement between two
foreign air carriers, both of which were "developed" carriers. The record
showed that TAP was fit, willing and able to perform the services on its
own, but it could do so only "at a prohibitive cost," and that the only
way TAP could gain a market identity in the highly competitive North
Atlantic market was through the arrangement proposed. The Examiner
also concluded that this case was analogous to the Air Afrique case inas-
much as Portugal's economic development had not kept pace with the
rest of the Western World.
"5Transportes Aereos Portugueses, S.A.R.L., CAB Doc. No. 16692 (OSN E-23820) June 1,
1966, approved by the President, June 14, 1966.
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2. Air Jamaica-BOAC-BWIA.'6
In August 1963, Air Jamaica Ltd. was incorporated as the national
carrier of Jamaica, with the government holding 51%; BOAC, 33 %;
and BWIA, 16% of the airline's stock. Air Jamaica entered into a wet
lease agreement with BOAC and BWIA for operations between Jamaica
and New York, and Jamaica and Miami. In March 1965, Air Jamaica
applied to the CAB for a foreign air carrier permit for its operations.
Inasmuch as it owned no aircraft, Air Jamaica's application stated that
the operations would be conducted under the wet lease arrangements with
BOAC and BWIA.
The Board issued a permit to Air Jamaica but required BOAC and
BWIA to obtain additional authority from the Board to conduct the
operations as wet lessors to Air Jamaica. Both BOAC and BWIA claimed
that neither carrier required additional authority from the CAB to operate
their respective sectors under the wet lease agreement. BOAC's rationale
was that the wet lease agreements did not constitute foreign air trans-
portation as defined in the Act. BWIA adopted BOAC's position and, in
addition, argued that it required no further authority from the CAB in-
asmuch as BWIA at that time held a permit for the Miami/Jamaica sector.
(BOAC did not have New York City/Jamaica authority.) Regarding the
contention of BOAC, the Board ruled that wet leases performed under
the direction and control, and pursuant to the safety authority, of a lessor
constitute air transportation by the lessor. Regarding BWIA's contention,
the Board ruled that nothing in BWIA's permit granted authority to
conduct operations other than in its own right.
The CAB's ruling clearly established that a foreign air carrier permit,
absent a provision to the contrary, authorizes operations only in the
holder's behalf and, further, that wet lease agreements constitute air trans-
portation, as defined in the Act, when performed under the direction,
control and safety authority of the lessor. Therefore, the question as to
which party has direction and control under a wet lease agreement is a
vital factor in the CAB's consideration as to whether or not authoriza-
tion will be granted.
3. VIASA-CDA."
In 1967, CDA, for competitive reasons, found it necessary to inaugurate
jet service to Miami and San Juan, Puerto Rico. Representatives of CDA
and VIASA met to study the feasibility of a plan of cooperation wherein
VIASA would provide scheduling, equipment, management, sales, pub-
licity, training, operations and related services for CDA over CDA's
routes. At that time, CDA's financial condition was unsatisfactory; the
company lacked suitable and modern equipment and was in need of a
complete reorganization. Both airlines agreed to obtain from their re-
spective aeronautical governmental authorities, to the greatest extent pos-
16 Air Jamaica Limited, CAB Doc. Nos. 15919 et al (OSN E-23280) Jan. 19, 1966, approved
by the President, Feb. 19, 1966.
1 7VIASA Enforcement Proceeding, CAB Doc. No. 18791 (OSN E-26975) June 25, 1968.
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sible, a limitation of competition from third parties and other such safe-
guards and advantages for their mutual interests. In May 1967, the air-
lines entered into a charter agreement under which VIASA agreed to
furnish a Venezuelan-registered DC-9 aircraft (leased from AVENSA),
with pilot and co-pilot, for three weekly round trips between Caracas and
Miami via San Juan, and between Santo Domingo and San Juan.
The charter agreement provided:
(a) That the pilot and co-pilot would not be employed by, nor wear the
uniform of, CDA nor be subject to CDA discipline;
(b) that the charters would operate designated flights in accordance with
designated schedules and not at the discretion of CDA;
(c) that VIASA would operate charters for other carriers with the aircraft
and crews at times not designated for operations of CDA;
(d) that VIASA would maintain the aircraft;
(e) that the aircraft would bear CDA markings on only one side; and
(f) that VIASA would bear the major risks of loss to the aircraft.
The air transport agreement with the Dominican Republic authorized
the Santo Domingo/Miami and Santo Domingo/San Juan operations; how-
ever, the Venezuelan air transport agreement did not authorize an opera-
tion between Caracas and Miami via Santo Domingo nor a Caracas/San
Juan sector.
This is a particularly significant case in inter-American aviation. VIASA
took the position before the Board that the agreement constituted a true
lease rather than a series of charters, that the entire operation was under
the direction and control of CDA, and that the aircraft would be operated
pursuant to the safety authority of CDA. The General Counsel of the
CAB did not concur and was of the opinion that the arrangement did
constitute an agreement for a series of charters involving routes to the
United States which could not lawfully be performed by VIASA unless
it was issued a foreign air carrier permit under section 402 of the Act.
In July 1967, an enforcement proceeding was initiated at the CAB, in
which proceeding the enforcement attorney requested that the Board
order VIASA to cease and desist from violations of the Act:
(a) By engaging in foreign air transport under the agreement with CDA
between Santo Domingo and San Juan and Santo Domingo and Miami;
and
(b) from engaging in unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of
competition by passing off the services of one of the carriers involved
as those of the other carrier involved, or passing off the services of either
as part of a unified system.
On 27 May 1968, the Examiner, under authority delegated to him by
the Board, issued a cease and desist order to VIASA. Neither VIASA nor
CDA filed petitions for discretionary review, nor did the Board take ac-
tion to review the order on its own initiative. The Examiner's decision,
then, became the final order of the Board, and the operations ceased after
some temporary extensions of' the effective date.
This case makes a clear distinction between leases and charter flights and
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restates the policy of the CAB that where charter flights constitute foreign
air transportation, appropriate authority must be obtained from the CAB.
In addition, it emphasizes that a wet lease will not be approved if the
lessor retains control so that the agreement in effect becomes a series of
charters or a pooling of revenues.
4. LANICA-TAN.1 8
In 1967, LANICA and TAN entered into a joint operating agreement
designed to assist LANICA with a better utilization of its BAC-111 jet
aircraft and to afford TAN an opportunity to commence jet service from
Honduras to Miami. The carriers initiated service by operating the aircraft
from Miami via San Pedro Sula, Honduras; San Salvador, El Salvador;
and Managua, Nicaragua. Inasmuch as the operation was deemed to be
outside the authority granted the carriers by the CAB, LANICA filed
for an amendment to its permit, and TAN was made a party to the pro-
ceeding in view of the wet lease and blocked space features of the joint
operating agreement.
The agreement between LANICA and TAN provided:
(a) That the carriers would jointly share the use of flight equipment for the
sector between San Salvador, San Pedro Sula and Miami;
(b) that the flights would be operated with BAC-111 equipment owned by
LANICA;
(c) that on the flights between San Salvador and Miami via San Pedro Sula,
each carrier would be allocated 37 seats;
(d) that the aircraft would be under the full control of LANICA during
the periods when the aircraft was jointly used; and
(e) that each carrier would have full control over the use of the space
assigned to it.
There were no bilateral agreements between the United States and Hon-
duras and Nicaragua. LANICA was authorized, under its operating per-
mit, to fly Managua/San Salvador/Miami, and TAN was authorized to
fly San Pedro Sula/Belize/Miami.
On 12 September 1968, the Examiner rendered his recommended de-
cision in this case. He observed that the Governments of Honduras and
Nicaragua were interested in furthering a general program of economic
integration, and, perhaps, this cooperative argeement would be a first step
toward an ultimate formation of a consortium of Central American air
carriers or the establishing of a new Central American airline. He noted
that the operations under the agreement began without prior approval of
the Board and that the Board would ordinarily take a dim view of such
action. However, he found no corporate interlocking relationships be-
tween the two air carriers, that they maintained separate offices and identi-
ties, that there was no pooling of revenues or of equipment other than
the BAC-111 and that, indeed, the airlines competed on the San Salva-
dor/Miami sector. It was further noted that TAN contemplated purchasing
its own equipment when traffic and its economic situation justified it.
'gLineas Aereas de Nicaragua, S. A. (LANICA), CAB Amendment, Doc. No. 19601 (OSN
69-2-7) Dec. 4, 1968, approved by the President, Feb. 1, 1969.
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The Examiner found that LANICA, in order to carry out the terms of
the agreement, did require authority under section 402 of the Act and
that it was in the public interest to grant such authority with appropriate
restrictions. On 4 December 1968, the Board adopted in the main the
recommended decision but toned down some of the suggested restrictions.
Interestingly, the Board found it unnecessary to pass on, and did not
adopt, the Examiner's observations about the possible formation of a
Central American airline consortium. The order and corresponding permit
contain the following provisions:
(a) Requiring the carriers to file all agreements, amendments and modifica-
tions regarding their services;
(b) prohibiting joint public relation activities tending to pass off the services
of one as the services of the other or as part of a unified system;
(c) specifically identifying all flights of each airline without reference to
the relation of the carrier performing general agency service;
(d) requiring maintenance of separate telephone facilities;
(e) requiring maintenance of separate identities of displays, advertising, desk
space, personnel uniforms, time payment application forms, and in all
public dealings; and(f) requiring the interior of the aircraft to identify the crew in operational
control and the exterior to show that the capacity of the aircraft is
shared by both airlines.
On 1 February 1969, President Nixon approved issuance of the permit
to LANICA, which permit terminates on 18 September 1970, upon termi-
nation of the joint operating agreement between TAN and LANICA, or
upon termination of the air carrier permit of TAN.
V. EVALUATION OF COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS
A. CAB View On The Various Types Of Cooperative Agreements.
The CAB has taken a position on most of the common forms of co-
operative agreements between airlines. Some conclusions can be derived
from the decisions and policy statements.
1. Leases.
When a United States air carrier is involved in a lease with a foreign
air carrier, sections 408 and 412 of the Act are applicable, and CAB
approval is required.'
Normally, the CAB is not involved in a simple dry lease between
foreign air carriers; however, the Board does become concerned when a
lease arrangement involves control by the lessor over the operations of
the aircraft. Such an arrangement may be considered as a series of charters,
and the lessor of the aircraft is then required to obtain a permit because
the lessor is deemed to be engaged in foreign air transportation.
In determining whether a particular arrangement amounts to a wet
'9 In some cases, it is possible for a U. S. air carrier to obtain an exemption granted under 5
416(b) under a relatively quick procedure. Since § 416(b) clearly refers to "air carriers" and
makes no reference to "foreign air carriers", this procedure is not available to foreign air carriers.
The Board has specifically held that this wording excludes foreign carriers. American Export Air-
lines, Inc. Acquisition of TACA, S. A., 13 C.A.B. 216, 221 (1941).
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lease and would require permit authority, the Board apparently will seek
to determine whether the lessor conducts the operation as a part of its
ordinary air carrier operations-using its flight crew and personnel, man-
uals, operating specifications and safety authority-or whether the lessor
has surrendered responsibility and control over the operation to the lessee.
2. Blocked Space.
In the usual blocked space agreement, the lessor retains "control of the
operation," and authority must, therefore, be obtained from the CAB.
3. Pooling.
Pooling arrangements involving a United States air carrier and a foreign
air carrier have been considered not to be in the national interest of the
United States. The same holds true for pooling between foreign air car-
riers on the basic ground that such agreements permit a combination of
carriers to render services which they could not undertake singly. Foreign
pools which substantially reduce competition to the detriment of the free
competition system sought by the United States have not been encouraged.
4. Interchanges.
Assuming that the proper route authorities exist and that the inter-
change is based on a true dry lease agreement with each carrier maintain-
ing its own identity, no serious problem should result.
B. Cooperative Agreements Between United States And
Foreign Air Carriers.
Before granting authorization for cooperative agreements between a
United States carrier and a foreign air carrier, the CAB has required that
the foreign air carrier establish that it is not relying upon the United
States carrier for the performance of its services under its foreign air
carrier permit. The foreign air carrier must demonstrate that it meets the
section 402 requirements of the Federal Aviation Act and is "fit, willing
and able to perform such services" on its own in order to obtain and
maintain its permit. However, there are exceptions where the CAB will
conditionally approve such cooperative agreements on certain grounds:
1. Economic Necessity.
The Seaboard-Lufthansa case offers an example of a cooperative
agreement which was approved for a limited period of time because
there were sufficient grounds proved of "economic necessity." However,
the provision for the pooling of revenues was struck from the agreement.
2. National Interest.
The Air Afrique" case demonstrated that an approval of a cooperative
working arrangement may be granted on the basis of "national interest"
where such approval would not have been warranted on aviation policy
grounds alone.
ao Agreement between Seaboard World Airlines, Inc., and Deutsch Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft,
supra note 12.
" Air Afrique, supra note 13.
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3. Special Circumstances.
In the Airlift-Alitalia" case, the CAB considered the "special circum-
stances" surrounding the case, i.e., that a dispute under the bilateral
agreement between the United States and Italy was in the process of
arbitration. The Board felt that these circumstances warranted an excep-
tion to the policy against long-period chartering of aircraft by a United
States air carrier to a foreign air carrier. However, once again, the Board
refused to permit a revenue-sharing clause to remain in the agreement.
Therefore, in general, cooperative agreements of this nature will be
approved only if reasonable grounds for an exception to the general rule
can be shown, such as economic necessity, national interest or special cir-
cumstances.
C. Cooperative Agreements Between Foreign Air Carriers.
In general, the Board has not been favorably disposed toward coopera-
tive agreements between foreign air carriers for similar considerations to
those in cases where a United States air carrier is involved. Once again,
however, some exceptions have been made, as the cases reflect. In the Air
Jamaica" application, a favorable determination was made on the ground
that it was in the "national interest" to assist a developing nation estab-
lish its flag carrier. Nevertheless, the Board required both of the foreign
air carrier-lessors, BOAC and BWIA, to obtain additional authority to
carry out the wet lease agreements.
Even in the case of an established air carrier, the CAB has approved a
cooperative agreement on the ground of "national interest." In the TAP-
Alitalia' authorization, the Board recognized that Portugal's economic
development had not kept pace with other countries of the Western
World. In addition, it was demonstrated that TAP had definite intentions
to acquire and operate its own facilities in the future.
D. Significant Factors In Cooperative Agreements.
A number of factors may be significant in the approval or disapproval
of cooperative agreements. A review of the cases decided by the CAB
and its policy statements indicate that the following factors have been
considered in the past and should be included in a "check list" for evalua-
tion purposes.
1. Stage of economic development of the countries involved.
2. Stage of development of the airlines involved.
3. Bilateral air transport agreements.
4. Route authorities.
5. Potential impact on existing markets and competition.
6. Duration of agreement.
7. Ability of one airline to obtain a greater utilization of expensive
equipment, pending development of its own market.
22 Application of Airlift International, Inc., supra note 14.
2 Air Jamaica, Ltd., supra note 16.
24 Transportes Aereos Portugueses, S.A.R.L., supra note 15.
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8. Ability of one airline to upgrade service, gain experience with
equipment, and develop markets pending eventual acquisition of
equipment on its own.
9. Extent of control of one airline on the operations of another, i.e.,
use of a true lease rather than a series of charters, e.g., whether
the operations are conducted under the flight manuals, operating
specifications and safety authority of another airline.
10. Ability of an airline to penetrate a highly competitive market on
an economically sound basis.
11. Probabilities that one airline will pass off its services as those of
the other or as part of one unified system, i.e., through the use of
joint promotions, public relations and advertising, inadequate
identification of personnel, desk space, tickets and exterior and
interior of aircraft.
12. Terms of general agency agreements.
13. Pooling of revenues.
14. Pooling of personnel, equipment and facilities in addition to the
specific flight operations.
15. Arbitrary division and/or restrictions of markets.
16. Whether operations commence prior to application for CAB
approval.
17. National interest considerations.
18. "Special circumstances."
E. Conditions Imposed On Cooperative Agreements.
Even when cooperative agreements have been approved, the CAB has
customarily imposed conditions such as:
1. Limiting duration of the agreements.
2. Filing of agreements and amendments thereto.
3. Filing of statistical information.
4. Limiting general agency activities.
5. Appropriately identifying the aircraft, outside and inside.
6. Prohibiting joint promotions.
7. Prohibiting joint public relations activities.
8. Prohibiting sharing of revenues.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has reviewed the policy of the United States Civil Aero-
nautics Board in the area of cooperative agreements involving foreign air
carriers during the current decade by highlighting some of the more sig-
nificant cases on the subject. Although each case must be considered on
its own merits, the CAB has provided certain guidelines which can serve
to guide those foreign airlines entering into cooperative agreements affect-
ing transportation to and from the United States.
Past experience would indicate that foreign air carriers contemplating
the use of wet lease, blocked space, or revenue-sharing arrangements on
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routes to the United States should consider obtaining prior CAB approval.
Obtaining such approvals ordinarily involves a considerable amount of
time and expense, and the carrier must be prepared to follow the pro-
cedures indicated and anticipate interventions by interested airlines. To
initiate operations under such cooperative agreements without prior CAB
approval, however, involves the risk of a subsequent cease and desist order
with the related consequences.
It should be emphasized that the position of the CAB in deciding whether
or not to grant authorization for cooperative agreements has been fairly
flexible in the past. In the light of the TAN-LANICA decision' and
the demands of the forthcoming decade, it can be anticipated that there
will be an even more flexible attitude on the part of the CAB in the future.
Lineas Aereas de Nicaragua, S. A. (LANICA), supra note 18.
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